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ABSTRACT
Every American generation has fought battles with foreign adversaries in
the name of securing freedom for future generations. On September 11,
2001, Generation Y was in elementary school when they saw the news of the
largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Yet, the ideology that spawned these
attacks continues to pose a threat to national security. This Note focuses on
the tension between establishing an effective detainment strategy and
complying with Supreme Court precedent. While the precedent clearly
proscribes certain strategies, it provides no guidance on the proper
detainment procedures. In response, this Note suggests that there should be
less judicial interference into the military’s detainment strategies regarding
the practice of classifying individuals as enemy combatants; the process
where those individuals are detained; the detainee’s recourse to Article III
courts; and the role of the Constitution and statutory regulations in vital
military operations.
Inherent in these components of detainment are three issues currently
plaguing the executive, legislative, and judicial branches: (1) the standard
for determining whether an enemy combatant is part of enemy forces; (2)
the legal process that best addresses the tension between liberty and
security; and (3) the length of detainment. This Note will discuss whether
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) authorizes, and
whether the Constitution permits, the detention of an individual on the
basis of membership in a radical terrorist organization—such as the
Taliban—not currently engaged in an armed conflict against the United
States. It will also address whether the AUMF or the Constitution limits the
duration of the detention when such an individual is detained, since the
Court did not have an opportunity to answer the detention question in
Hussain v. Obama, and thus left the military without any guidance on the
Constitutional or statutory standards for resolving the durational question.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the tension between security and liberty is ongoing
and becoming more strained as threats to national security increase. This
tension is shared among the executive, the legislature, and the judicial
branches, all of which are attempting to maintain national security while
determining the treatment of individuals who have committed crimes
against the United States. All the while, these enemies do not fit within the
traditional definitions of what constitutes a state actor, a non-state, or an
international armed conflict. They do not fit within these traditional
definitions because of the increasing unification of their operations separate
from any state actor.
To reduce judicial second guessing, this Note proposes that (1) detainees
should be detained based solely on a military tribunal’s finding that they are
unlawful enemy combatants; (2) trials for war crimes by a military
commission, with certain procedural safeguards, are adequate to meet due
process; and (3) the length of detainment should rest on evidence of
continued dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)
Congress passed the AUMF in the wake of the attacks on September 11,
2001. The resolution’s purpose is to “authorize the use” of the military
against “those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the
United States.”1 The AUMF grants the President of the United States the
“authority under the Constitution to take actions to deter and prevent acts
of international terrorism against the United States.”2 Section 2(a) provides
the justification for actions taken overseas and at home in the name of
preventing terrorism against the United States. It states:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any

1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
2. Id.
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future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons.3
Section 2(b) states that all of the powers vested therein are consistent with
the War Powers Resolution.4
B. The War Powers Resolution
The purpose of the War Powers Resolution is to “fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution” by limiting the President’s power in sending
the United States Armed Forces into hostilities.5 It invokes the “Necessary
and Proper” Clause found in Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution in
determining that the President’s Commander in Chief responsibilities could
only be exercised pursuant to “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”6
By passing the AUMF, Congress, in effect, released the President from
the restraints imposed by the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers
Resolution was an attempt to limit the Executive’s Commander in Chief
powers; the AUMF is an attempt to expand them. The President already
had the power to authorize the use of military force against those
responsible for the attacks on 9/11 under the War Powers Resolution,
because 9/11 was a “national emergency created by attack upon the United
States.”7 While the AUMF stipulates that it does not supersede the War
Powers Resolution, the AUMF serves as the justification for the continued
detention of combatants in Afghanistan and Iraq.8 Consequently,
throughout these hostilities, there have been persons captured and deemed
lawful or unlawful enemy combatants. Due process dictates that those who
are detained must have an opportunity to contest the status of their
detainment.9 However, determining the classification of detainees and their
accompanying right to contest their classification is extremely controversial.
Such controversy led the Supreme Court to decide Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West 1973).
Id.
Id.
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
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v. Rumsfield in 2004, which then led to the establishment of the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRT”).10
C. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
The Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) is an administrative
process used to determine whether each detainee under the control of the
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay meets the criteria of an enemy
combatant.11 Punishment is not the purpose of the CSRT.12 Instead, the
purpose is to prevent enemy combatants from returning to the battlefield
and engaging in further attacks against both civilians and U.S. Forces.13
The CSRT operates under the supervision of three “neutral
commissioned officers” who determine, under a preponderance of the
evidence standard, whether the “evidence supports an enemy combatant
determination.”14 In the CSRT, each individual has the right to
representation, the right to receive a summary of evidence against him, the
right to have exculpatory evidence provided to the tribunal, and the right to
have any new information relating to the individual’s status heard in a
newly convened tribunal.15
Consistent with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, those detained
under unlawful enemy combatant status are not entitled to the benefit of
Prisoner of War (“POW”) status.16 However, after Hamdi v. Rumsfield, the
United States Supreme Court provided a path for unlawful enemy
combatants to contest their status and the “basis for their detention.”17 The
Court further held that a detainee has a right of habeas corpus,18 even after
review of the combatant’s status by a military tribunal.

10. Combatant
Status
Review
Tribunals:
Purpose,
DEP’T
OF
DEF.,
http://archive.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/ d20061017CSRT.pdf. (last visited October 14,
2016) [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF.].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 10.
17. Id.
18. Habeas corpus is a “writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently
to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” Writ of habeas corpus
mandates that a detainee must be produced before the issuing court to determine whether
his detention is lawful. Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014).
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D. Hamdi v. Rumsfield: Procedural Protections for Citizen-Detainees
Hamdi is the principal case that extended habeas corpus procedural
protections to every citizen-detainee within the United States, including
unlawful enemy combatants.19 Petitioner Hamdi was seized for allegedly
taking up arms with the Taliban.20 The U.S. government claimed that
Hamdi’s status as an enemy combatant justified holding him indefinitely,
without formal charges or proceedings.21 The government also argued that
since it was “‘undisputed’ that Hamdi’s seizure took place in a combat zone,
the habeas determination can be made purely as a matter of law, with no
further hearing or fact finding necessary.”22 The Hamdi Court reaffirmed
that detentions cannot last longer than active hostilities. The Hamdi
decision was consistent with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions,23
which state that “[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”24 In Hamdi, the Court
also determined that, counter to Hamdi’s argument, the government can
detain individuals for the entire duration of hostilities as part of the lawful
exercise of “necessary and appropriate force.”25 However, it must be
sufficiently clear that the individual is an enemy combatant in order to do
so.26
The U.S. government also made a separation of powers argument, which
has been a significant source of tension and ongoing debate.27 The
government argued that “[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited
institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military decision-making in
connection with an ongoing conflict” requires very limited, individual,
independent inquiry into the executive branch’s detention scheme.28 This
argument was struck down by the Court, which reasoned that “the threats
to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are
not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully

19. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004).
20. Id. at 510.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 526.
23. Id. at 520.
24. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (Feb. 2, 1956).
25. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
26. Id. at 523.
27. Id. at 527.
28. Id.
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the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.”29 The
Court weighed the competing interests of liberty and security, and
ultimately concluded that the threat to liberty outweighed the risks to
security.30 Weighing liberty against security is the heart of the ongoing
debate. The CSRTs were created to comply with Hamdi’s requirements.31
However, the “due process versus security” debate did not end here, but
appeared again in Boumediene v. Bush.
E. Boumediene v. Bush: Noncitizen Enemy Combatants
In Boumediene, the government contended that noncitizen enemy
combatants detained in territories located outside our Nation’s borders
have “no constitutional rights and no privilege of habeas corpus.”32 The
reach of the Suspension Clause became a key issue in determining whether
noncitizen or foreign national enemy combatants are entitled to
constitutional protections. The Suspension Clause provides that “[t]he
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”33 The
Court established three factors in determining the Suspension Clause’s
reach: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature
of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the
writ.”34
The Boumediene Court also entertained a separation of powers argument
and acknowledged the risk that applying the Suspension Clause to military
detentions abroad may divert the military’s attention from vital tasks.35
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, once again, valued liberty over security
and extended habeas corpus protections to noncitizen detainees held
abroad, despite the separation of powers concern.36

29. Id. at 535.
30. Id. at 532. (“It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our
Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”).
31. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 10.
32. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
34. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
35. Id. at 769.
36. Id. at 771.
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F. Hussain v. Obama: Walks like a Duck, Talks like a Duck, Must be a
Duck
Since 2008, when Boumediene was decided, questions of constitutional
detainment and classification of enemy combatants have become more
complicated. The complications stem from the supposed end of armed
conflict against the United States in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of U.S.
military members from Afghanistan.37 Detainees with ties to the Taliban or
al Qaeda are still currently held in the custody of the United States Armed
Forces. These complications concerning Taliban and al Qaeda detainees
were addressed by the court in Hussain v. Obama.
The D.C. Circuit adopted the common sense “walks like a duck” test in
Hussain v. Obama to determine that the facts and circumstances (such as
where that detainee has lived) of each case dictates whether a detainee is
“part of” an enemy group. As the common saying goes, if the thing looks
like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck.38 In
this case, Appellant Abdul al Qadar Ahmed Hussain moved from Yemen to
Pakistan, and eventually departed for Afghanistan where he resided with
three Taliban guards.39 While there, Hussain was provided with an AK-47
rifle and trained in its use.40 After 9/11, Hussain fled Afghanistan and
returned to Pakistan where he lived at a Jama’at al-Tablighi mosque.41 He
was captured in 2002 and transferred to Guantanamo Bay.42
Hussain argued that in order to justify his status as an enemy combatant,
the government must show that Hussain “personally picked up arms and
engaged in active hostilities against the United States.”43 The D.C. Circuit
admitted that there are no “categorical rules to determine whether a
detainee is ‘part of’ an enemy group.’”44 Because there are no categorical
rules, the court engaged in a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether
Hussain’s ten-month stay with the Taliban and his carrying of an AK-47
pointed to his membership of the Taliban.45 The court concluded that the

37. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the End of the Combat
Mission in Afghanistan (Dec. 28, 2014).
38. Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
39. Id. at 966.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 969.
42. Id. at 966.
43. Id. at 967.
44. Hussain, 718 F.3d at 968.
45. Id.
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evidence did point to his membership.46 Hussain’s final argument was that
the district court did not determine whether he was “affiliated with al
Qaeda, the Taliban, or both.”47 The court swiftly struck down this argument
by stating, “[b]oth are enemy forces, and affiliation with either justifies
detention.”48
In this case, Hussain was captured near the front lines of the battle, lived
with Taliban warriors for ten months, and learned how to use and carry an
AK-47.49 He demonstrated all the signs and characteristics of being an
unlawful enemy combatant, and, thus, must have been an unlawful enemy
combatant who was affiliated with the Taliban.50 However, in Justice
Edward’s concurring opinion, he eviscerated the majority’s “walks like a
duck test” and concluded that the President and Congress must begin
strongly considering a different approach to determining Guantanamo Bay
detainee cases.51
Subsequently, Hussain appealed the D.C. Circuit’s decision to the
Supreme Court.52 Hussain’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court did not specifically ask the Court to address whether Hussain was
engaged in active hostilities.53 By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court
declined to determine whether the D.C. Circuit was correct in its decision
that the evidence supported a finding that Hussain was “part of” either the
Taliban or al Qaeda.54 Although certiorari was ultimately denied, Justice
Breyer stated,
The Court has not directly addressed whether the AUMF
authorizes, and the Constitution permits, detention on the basis
that an individual was part of al Qaeda, or part of the Taliban,
but was not ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United
States’ in Afghanistan prior to his capture. Nor have we
considered whether, assuming detention on these bases is

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 970.
Id.
Id.
Hussain, 718 F.3d at 969.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 972-73.
Hussain v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 1621 (2014).
Id. at 1622.
Id.
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permissible, either the AUMF or the Constitution limits the
duration of detention.55
This Note addresses Breyer’s unanswered question. The Supreme Court has
not yet decided whether the government must prove that unlawful enemy
combatants were engaged in armed conflict in order to detain them, or
simply that they were a member in an associated force. These questions
cannot remain unanswered as “[a] solid U.S. law-of-war detainee program
is a key component of the U.S. national defense and strategy now and in the
future.”56
III. PERSONS SUBJECT TO DETENTION
A. In Ex parte Quirin: Offenders Against the Law of War
During World War II, German saboteurs landed near Jacksonville,
Florida, buried their uniforms, and disguised themselves in civilian
clothes.57 After landing, they were arrested by the FBI, tried before a
military tribunal, and subsequently executed.58 The Supreme Court upheld
the process whereby the saboteurs were executed.59 The Court recognized
the traditional distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants by
stating:
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful
populations of belligerent nations and also between those who
are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are
subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing
military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform
passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to
gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly
55. Id.
56. Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Detention Operations: A Strategic Overview, U.S. MILITARY
OPERATIONS 275, 305 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2016).
57. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).
58. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 400 (5th
ed. 2016).
59. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
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through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of
life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals.60
Because the Germans did not identify themselves, but instead secretly
operated with the intention of destructing life and property, they were not
entitled to the protections of POW status. Accordingly, military tribunals
were sufficient to determine their status and the consequences of their
secretive, untraditional actions. In the years since World War II, America’s
enemies have changed, but their untraditional form of warfare has not.
B. Classification, Classification, Classification
Modern conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen “the emergence of a
third category of detainees: unprivileged enemy belligerents.”61 Combatant
status originated from the 1907 Hague Convention, which resulted in the
Regulations Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land.62 These
regulations applied the laws, rights, and duties of war not only to armies,
but also to militia and volunteer corps meeting the following criteria: “[t]o
be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; [t]o have a
fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; [t]o carry arms openly;
and [t]o conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.”63 After World War II, the Third Geneva Convention clearly
delineated that POWs are captured combatants who fulfill the abovementioned criteria.64 POWs “enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal.”65
Many of America’s modern enemies do not fit the traditional mold of a
lawful enemy combatant. Unlawful enemy combatants do not fit into the

60. Id. at 30–31.
61. Jeffrey Bovarnick & Jack Vrett, Detention Operations at the Tactical and Operational
Levels, U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 307, 337 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2016).
62. LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT:
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 98 (2016).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 102 (citing Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, supra note 24).
65. Id.
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Geneva Convention’s Article 4 description of POWs.66 An unlawful enemy
combatant is not part of an identifiable command structure, has no
distinguishing insignia, does not carry arms openly, and does not conduct
operations in accordance with the law and customs of war.67 Unlawful
enemy combatants are also referred to as “persons who fight without the
right to engage in hostilities; that is, persons who are not part of any regular
army or militia and would never qualify as combatants or prisoners of
war.”68
However, the military conflict between al Qaeda, ISIS, and associated
forces blurs the line between an unlawful enemy combatant and a POW.69
Al Qaeda, in particular, operates using a hierarchical structure and
performs military-style operations with a “clear rank structure.”70 Also,
terrorist organizations do not report to a state and, therefore, are non-state
actors,71 unlike the enemies that the U.S. faced in World War II. Although
most terrorist organizations arguably have an identifiable command
structure, their members do not “wear uniforms, carry . . . arms openly or
mass [their] troops at the borders of the nations [they] attack . . . .”72 They
also do not carry on their “operations” in accordance with the laws of war,
as demonstrated through attacks such as the World Trade bombing in 1992,
the 1998 East African bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 9/11
attacks.73 Because America’s modern enemies demonstrate factors from
both unlawful enemy combatant status and POW status, the traditional
definition of both classifications has been strained. However, determining
the status of a person is of utmost importance in determining whether the
protections of the Geneva Convention attach to the individual.
C. Hamdan v. Rumsfield: Character of the Conflict? International v. NonInternational
In Hamdan, the Supreme Court determined the conflicts with al Qaeda
and the Taliban were not international armed conflicts.74 The Court decided
66. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
24, at art. 4.
67. Blank & Noone, supra note 62, at 93-94.
68. Id. at 104.
69. Id.
70. Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 276.
71. Id. at 277.
72. Blank & Noone, supra note 62, at 94.
73. Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 277.
74. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630-32 (2006).
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that these conflicts were non-international armed conflicts because these
organizations were non-state actors.75 A non-international conflict, as
understood in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, includes an
armed conflict that involves one or more non-governmental armed
groups.76 On the other hand, an international armed conflict involves one
or more States involved in armed force against another State.77 Thus,
international armed conflicts are those that oppose a High Contracting
Party, meaning a State.78 Because an international armed conflict does not
require a formal declaration of war,79 determining whether an international
armed conflict exists depends on a fact specific inquiry into what occurs on
the ground.80 Once an international armed conflict is established,
international humanitarian law applies and the protections of the Geneva
Convention attach to those captured.81 Contrarily, Article 3 protections
require that those captured in non-international armed conflict appear
before a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”82
In determining whether the conflicts with al Qaeda and the Taliban were
of an international or non-international character, the Court adopted a type
of original intent line of reasoning.83 The Court stated that the Convention
did consider “limiting language that would have rendered Common Article
3 applicable ‘especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of
religion,’ [which] was omitted from the final version of the Article, which
coupled broader scope of application with a narrower range of rights than
did earlier proposed iterations.”84 Without addressing whether the facts of
Hamdan fit within the proposed definition, the Court concluded that the
conflicts with the Taliban and al Qaeda were non-international conflicts.85

75. Id.
76. INT’L COMM’N. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT”
DEFINED
IN
INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN
LAW?
1
(2008),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
24.
83. See Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
84. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.
85. Id. at 630-31.
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The distinction the Hamdan Court provided between non-international
and international armed conflict was taken from the Commentary on the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1989, which
provides that the difference between a non-international and international
armed conflict is the legal status of the opposing entities.86 Al Qaeda and the
Taliban do not report to a state and, therefore, they do not have the legal
status of a nation state.87 The classification of a “non-state actor” would be
the differentiating “legal status” that classifies conflicts with terrorist
organizations as non-international armed conflicts. This classification
comports with the Court’s interpretation of a non-international conflict as
one that “does not involve a clash between nations.”88
D. From Capture to Detainment
At the point of capture, regardless of the prisoners’ classification, all
personnel have six steps to ensure legal and safety protocols are satisfied:
“(1) Search, (2) Silence, (3) Safeguard, (4) Segregate, (5) Speed to the Rear,
and (6) Tag.”89 This strict process “transforms legal obligations related to
the protection and respect of all detainees into a battle drill for the
personnel most likely to capture them.”90 After an Article 5 tribunal
determines whether the captured is a POW or an unlawful enemy
combatant, the captured person is transferred to a Theater Internment
Facility (“TIF”) where other persons of the same classification are kept.91
The largest TIF in Iraq, Camp Bucca, once housed twenty-five thousand
detainees.92 However, that number was drawn down near the end of the war
as the detainees were either released or turned over to the Iraqi government
for prosecution or another form of disposition.93 There is also a similar plan
in Afghanistan to draw down the detention facility in Parwan and hand the
detainees over to the Afghan government for prosecution of crimes.94
However, an immense problem remains because Afghanistan has not
developed an effective criminal justice system with the ability to handle the
large amount of detainees that would be suddenly thrust upon it.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 277.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630.
Bovarnick & Vrett, supra note 61, at 317.
Id.
Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 294.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nevertheless, Afghanistan and similar countries have just cause to
prosecute those who have committed atrocities against their own people,
just as our armed forces have just cause to prosecute atrocities committed
against the U.S.
E. Defining “Part Of” Enemy Forces—Mattan v Obama
In Mattan v. Obama, the appellants, Mattan, along with seven other
detainees, brought a habeas proceeding to challenge the legality of their
detention.95 The issue before the court was whether the petitioners’
detainment was within the scope of the government’s authority and
consistent with domestic law and laws of war.96 The United States
government claimed that it had the authority under the AUMF to detain
persons who were “part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida
forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.”97 The D.C. district court struck down two
definitions proposed by the federal government as falling “outside the
bounds” of the AUMF.98 First, the government did not have the “authority
to detain those who ‘substantially supported’ enemy forces.”99 Second, those
who have “directly supported hostilities” by aiding enemy forces are not
considered “part of” those enemy forces and do not fall under the
authorization of the AUMF.100 Nevertheless, the D.C. court upheld the one
aspect of the government’s definition, which included a provision that those
who are “part of” such forces are properly subject to detainment.101
Furthermore, “support of” enemy forces can still be used as a factor in
determining whether a detainee is “part of” enemy forces, but it is not
sufficient as a stand-alone test for determining lawful detainment.102 “Part
of” means those who are members of enemy forces “at the time of their
capture.”103
The Mattan court denied that it was drafting its own definitions,
reasoning instead that the court must determine whether the proposed

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2009).
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
Id.
Id. at n.3.
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definition fits the within the President’s authority under the AUMF.104
Although the D.C. court accepted the government’s provision that those
who are “part of” enemy forces fall under the AUMF, the court seemingly
did create its own definition of “part of” by excluding those who
substantially or directly support enemy forces.
Although Judge Lamberth’s clarification in his majority opinion in
Mattan is important in understanding who can be lawfully detained, it is
not within the judiciary’s “province” to “draft definitions.”105 As the drafter
of the AUMF, only Congress has the proper authority to draft or amend the
definitions to clarify its statutory intent. Most of our traditional definitions
were designed for a traditional enemy; such definitions do not account for
the fact that our modern-day conflicts blur the distinction between the law
of war and traditional law enforcement.106
The purpose of law of war detentions is to remove enemies from the
battlefield and to prevent them from returning.107 Members in
organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban can be captured and
prevented from returning to the battlefield, but they also can be tried under
the criminal law for crimes they have committed.108 However, the Mattan
court did not extend the definition of “part of” to include “substantial”
support because of its possible implication of domestic criminal law.109 The
problem is that modern law of war overlaps with criminal law, and a refusal
to recognize this dilemma destabilizes a solid detainee strategy.110 The
judiciary is not tasked with drafting definitions; the legislature has the
authority to redraft provisions that will adequately adjust traditional
definitions to include the overlap of law of war and criminal law detentions.
Establishing a captured person’s classification will determine the legal
process that attaches to that classification and how to proceed with the

104. Id. at 26. In addition, consider also Judge Leon’s statement:
I do not believe . . . that it is the province of the judiciary to draft definitions. It
is our limited role to determine whether definitions crafted by either the
Executive or the Legislative branch, or both, are consistent with the President’s
authority under the [AUMF] and his war powers under Article II of the
Constitution.
Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008).
105. Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
106. Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 276.
107. Id. at 275.
108. Id. at 277. Zacarias Moussaoui was a 9/11 co-conspirator tried in Article III courts
and sentenced to life in prison. Id. at n.8.
109. Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26 n.3.
110. Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 276.
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prosecution of that individual, thus contributing to less Article III
intervention into detainment procedures. The solution is for the Court to
defer to the Executive in exercising war-making power and to Congress in
exercising its law-making power.
IV. WHAT LEGAL PROCESS ATTACHES TO THOSE DETAINED?
A. What About Harm to Defendant’s Liberty?
“Internment without trial is so antithetical to the rule of law as
understood in a democratic society that recourse to it requires to be
carefully scrutinized by the courts of that society.”111 In a sense, this is an
argument of the lesser of the two evils: either we secure liberty at the
possible risk of security, or we maintain security at the cost of fundamental
liberties. Due process dictates that individuals must be protected from
arbitrary deprivations of liberty through certain procedural safeguards.112 It
requires that “a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the
case against him and opportunity to meet it.”113
Ultimately, the enemy combatants argue that nonintervention will
impede their liberty.114 The alternative is to allow intervention based on
“irreparable psychological harm” or the risk that the litigant’s defense will
be divulged before trial in a federal court.115 The sum of the argument is that
the litigant will suffer “great and immediate” injury and the federal court
must not abstain.116 Irreparable harm is the first requirement for a litigant to
fit within the exception of no abstention.117 The second requirement is that
the defendant must also show that the alternative tribunal is “incapable of
fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it.”118 In the case of In
re Al-Nashiri, the court concluded that the possibility of a psychological
injury did not jeopardize his opportunity of a fair hearing in the military
commission and, thus, intervention was not warranted.119

111. Bovarnick & Vrett, supra note 61, at 321 (quoting Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom,
2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092).
112. Id. at 331.
113. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
114. In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 133 (2016).
115. Id. at 128.
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123–24 (1975)).
119. Id. at 129.
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Essentially, the basis of a detainment strategy should be kept at the lowest
level possible. First, the sensitive nature of these cases requires that certain
considerations relevant to national security allow them to be treated
differently. The detainment strategy requires the protection of individual
and public safety by handling sensitive intelligence. Second, the military is
better equipped to handle detention decisions due to the necessity of using
evidence that is obtained in the course of standard military operations. The
military commissions currently established are the result of extensive
Congressional debate. Thus, deference to Congress implicitly suggests that
the military system established for determining status is adequate to provide
Constitutional protections. Therefore, decisions on whom to detain and
whom to release should not be removed to Article III courts, but left in the
“theater of war” and “normalize[d] . . . into routine military operations.”120
B. Noncitizen Detainee
The federal habeas corpus statute allows prisoners within the jurisdiction
of federal courts to challenge the validity of their imprisonment.121 In Rasul
v. Bush, the petitioner challenged his imprisonment in Guantanamo Bay
under the federal habeas statute.122 In that case, the issue was “whether the
habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of executive
detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises
plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ‘ultimate sovereignty.’”123 The
Court concluded that aliens held at Guantanamo Bay fell within the scope
of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because the United States exercises complete control
and jurisdiction over that base.124 However, the Court failed to address
where aliens were to bring petitions for relief. Since the base does not
technically fall under any federal court’s jurisdiction, the Court fashioned a
different standard. Unfortunately, the Court-created remedy brings more
complications than answers.
The Rasul decision effectively overturned Johnson v. Eisentrager, which
held that aliens detained outside the United States are not entitled to invoke
a petition for habeas corpus.125 The dissent in Rasul argued that the

120.
121.
(2008).
122.
123.
124.
125.

Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 302.
28 U.S.C. § 2241, declared unconstitutional by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 468 (2004).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 468.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790-91 (1950).
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majority’s decision was a “wrenching departure from precedent.”126 The
majority’s decision in Rasul extended, for the first time, the federal court’s
jurisdiction beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts.127 The dissent
also correctly stated that the extension of the habeas statute over noncitizen
detainees is properly left to Congress.128 It further argued that if Congress
had wanted to change federal jurisdiction, it could have easily done so.129
The departure of the Court into matters properly left to the legislature was
appropriately recognized by the Rasul dissent as a creation of a “monstrous
scheme in time of war” and created a “frustration of our military
commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law.”130 Such a sudden
departure from precedent was, indeed, “judicial adventurism of the worst
sort.”131
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfield
In Hamdan v. Rumsfield, the Court erred once more by deeming the
military commissions established by the executive branch as not regularly
constituted courts adequate to meet due process.132 The dissent in Hamdan
correctly stressed that the Judiciary does not have the “aptitude, facilities
nor responsibility” to make military and foreign policy decisions.133 Too
much judicial interference at home negatively affects the Commander in
Chief’s and Congress’s ability to conduct foreign affairs abroad.134 The
Court’s decision in Hamdan to strike down trial by military commissions
was judicial interference into a political decision, which should have been
entitled to a “heavy measure of deference.”135 In his dissent, Justice Alito
argued that military commissions fit squarely within the definition of a
regularly constituted court.136 Indeed, a military commission is typically
made up of military officers who try both “fact and law.”137 The military

126. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 485 (Stevens, J.).
128. Id. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting.).
129. Id. at 506.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 564 (2006).
133. Id. at 688 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134. Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 301.
135. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 725 (Alito, J., dissenting).
137. Amanda Schaffer, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth Analysis of
the Government’s Right to Classify United States Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as Enemy
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commissions do not use the Federal Rules of Evidence in their
proceedings.138 Instead, the Presiding Officer determines whether “evidence
would have probative value to a reasonable person.”139 In order to convict
the detainee for crimes he has committed, two-thirds of the military panel
must agree.140 The detainee is also entitled to counsel.141 Thus, there are
certain procedural safeguards that have been established to ensure that the
detainee can present a defense.
2. Deference to the Executive in War-Making Power and to Congress
in Law-Making Power
The Boumediene Court’s decision rejected the notion that habeas corpus
could be withheld from a detainee and further concluded that the tribunals
were inadequate to satisfy due process.142 Key to its rationale was that the
detainee has a limited means to rebut the government’s factual assertion
that he is an enemy combatant.143 Consistent with the Court’s tradition of
rejecting detainment strategies established by Congress and the Executive,
despite failing to provide more concrete procedures of its own, the
Boumediene decision knocked down the “most generous set of procedural
protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy
combatants.”144 Justice Roberts even went so far as to suggest that the
Court’s decision was not about detainment at all, but rather the Court’s
attempt to control federal policy over enemy combatants.145 Although the
majority paid lip service to the “proper deference . . . to the political
branches,”146 the Court ignored precedent as set out in Eisentrager, declined
to say how the statute failed to address petitioner’s due process rights, and
failed to establish a standard that would provide “adequate” procedural
safeguards that Congress has not already addressed.147 Indeed, “[s]ecurity

Combatants and Try Those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1465, 1470 (2003).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1470-71.
140. Id. at 1471.
141. Id.
142. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 729 (2008).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 801 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J.).
147. Id. at 801 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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subsists . . . in fidelity to freedom’s first principles,”148 but other than
establishing that habeas cannot be suspended for detainees, the Court did
not establish what rights detainees have. They left that determination for
the district courts to sift out amongst themselves.
3. Heightened Security Interest in Military Commissions
Military commissions play an important role in military operations in
preventing future terrorist attacks. Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., a
retired Judge Advocate General of the Army, emphasized the importance of
military commissions by stating that they are needed to address “legitimate
concerns for public and individual safety, the compromise of sensitive
intelligence, and due regard for the practical necessity to use as evidence
information obtained in the course of military operation rather than
through traditional law enforcement means.”149 The sensitive nature of
these cases require that certain considerations relevant to national security
allow them to be treated differently, while still providing the accused with
constitutional protections. Although the tribunals may vary in procedures,
structure, or composition, they still fall into the category of a “regularly
constituted court.”150
C. Federal Court Intervention & the Necessity of Maintaining National
Security
The United States’ current military commissions system “is the product
of an extended dialogue among the President, Congress, and the Supreme
Court.”151 Although the Supreme Court has not provided concrete
guidance, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (“MCA”), as upheld by the
Al-Nashiri court, provides sufficient procedural protections and review
mechanisms for military commissions and also provides an adequate
framework for reviewing challenges to enemy combatants’ status.152 The
MCA established the Court of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”),
which reviews decisions of military commissions.153 As part of the revised
148. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J.).
149. September 11, 2001: Attack on America DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms
While Defending Against Terrorism - Statement of Michael J. Nardotti Before the
Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate; December 4, 2001,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/nardotti_001.asp. (last visited September 28, 2017).
150. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 727-28 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting).
151. In re al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
152. In re al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
153. Id. at 115.
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MCA, Article III courts are given jurisdiction to review the legal
conclusions of the CMCR, but only after the CMCR has actually made a
final determination on the merits.154 In Al-Nashiri, the D.C. Circuit upheld
the process of the CMCR; key to its determination were certain comity
factors.155 The first factor is advancing the military’s interest in allowing
these commissions to proceed uninterrupted in order to achieve the
efficient operation of the military free from regular interference by civilian
courts.156 The second is the deference duly owed to Congress when it
created “an integrated system of military courts and review procedures, a
critical element of which is the Court of Military Appeals consisting of
civilian judges completely removed from all military influence or
persuasion.”157 These same comity factors, which were crucial to the holding
of Al-Nashiri, should also be central when determining the system of review
of an enemy combatant’s status.
1. Al-Nashiri
In Al-Nashiri, the petitioner, Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed AlNashiri, was the alleged mastermind of the U.S.S. Cole and the French
supertanker, the M/V Limburg, bombings, as well as the attempted
bombing of the U.S.S. The Sullivans.158 Directed by Osama bin Laden, AlNashiri and his co-conspirator, Walid bin Attas, traveled to Yemen, bought
explosives and a boat, and obtained false identification documents.159 AlNashiri also received explosives training from an al-Qaeda expert when he
returned to Afghanistan.160 Al-Nashiri directed his suicide bombers to fill
their boat with explosives and steer it alongside their targets and then
detonate the explosives.161 Together, the completed attacks killed eighteen
crew members and injured dozens more.162 Al-Nashiri was arrested by the
local authorities in Dubai, turned over to U.S. custody, and transferred to
Guantanamo Bay in 2006.163 A CSRT determined that Al-Nashiri was an

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
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enemy combatant and, thus, detainable under the AUMF.164 Al-Nashiri
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging various aspects of his
detention.165 Though his habeas petition is still pending, a military
commission has convened to try him for terrorism, murder in violation of
the law of war, and attacking civilians.166 The government is seeking the
death penalty.167
Al-Nashiri claims that a military commission does not have jurisdiction
to try him under the MCA because he did not commit a war crime.168 He
claims that his actions were “not ‘committed in the context of and
associated with hostilities.’”169 Al-Nashiri moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent his trial by military commission until the district
court issued a decision on his habeas petition.170 The government filed a
counter motion to hold the habeas proceedings in abeyance in order for the
commission to continue its proceedings and the government’s interlocutory
appeals to be completed.171 The government argued that the same logic
found in Schlesinger v. Councilman, which prohibited courts from
interfering with ongoing courts-martial, equally applies here to direct
federal courts to abstain from interfering with ongoing proceedings in a
military commission.172 Al-Nashiri unsuccessfully argued that, despite the
MCA revisions, abstention was inappropriate as decided in Hamdan.173 The
district court agreed with the government, finding that Al-Nashiri’s habeas
petition would “unduly interfere” with the proceedings of the military
commission.174
2. Incorporating Al-Nashiri into the Detainment Framework
The court’s underlying rationale and analysis in determining that the
MCA provided adequate procedural safeguards that satisfy both liberty and
security provides a solid framework for allowing military detention
operations to operate without unduly burdensome interference from Article

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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171.
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Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c)).
Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 116.
Id.
Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 116-17.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 117.
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III courts. The court looked to “equally compelling” factors to determine
whether the revised MCA was sufficient to replace what was purportedly
lacking in Hamdan.175 First, the court must be assured of the adequacy of
the alternative system in protecting defendant’s rights.176 The D.C. Circuit
correctly concluded that the adequacy of the alternative system could be
“assumed” due to deference to the legislature.177 The Al-Nashiri court
concluded that the MCA’s review structure was adequate based on its
similarities to the court-martial review system approved in Schlesinger.178
Second, the court must be assured of the “importance of the interests served
by allowing that system to proceed uninterrupted by federal courts.”179 The
countervailing interest at the top of the list for military review tribunals is
national security. In analyzing the second factor, the D.C. Circuit Court in
Al-Nashiri correctly deferred to the political branches in the arena of
national security.
a. Factor one: the adequacy of the alternative system
The MCA review structure affirmed in Al-Nashiri is not only adequate
for military commissions, but is also adequate for reviewing status
determinations. The MCA requires a trial with a military judge and a
twelve-person jury, consisting of military officers called “members.”180 If the
defendant is found guilty, the Defense Department official who referred the
case to trial, known as the convening authority, then reviews the guilty
finding. The convening authority has the ability to reduce conviction to a
lesser-included offense of guilt.181 The convening authority may either
approve the sentence, disapprove, commute, or suspend either the entire
sentence, or any part thereof.182 If the convening authority confirms or
modifies the guilty finding, then the conviction goes through another level
of review under the CMCR, unless the defendant waives such review.183 The
CMCR provides a level of review that is more insulated from military
influence because it contains not only military judges, but also civilian

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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Id. at 121.
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Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 121.
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Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 122.
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judges who have Article III life tenure and salary protection.184 The CMCR
has the power to review both factual and legal questions. The district court
can then review all questions of law and the sufficiency of the evidence
upon appeal.185 Finally, the ruling of the district court can be challenged by
filing a petition of writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court.186
Therefore, the defendant has the protection of four layers of review, and
the Article III courts cannot interfere until the military has completed its
trial and review of a guilty finding. Important in the Al-Nashiri court’s
rationale, and, what the Supreme Court should adopt, was the principle that
intervention into the “on-the-ground” performance of the system
(consisting of military commissions designed by Congress and the
Executive) was not warranted.187 By allowing the defendant to be processed
through the respective military review tribunals, the D.C. Circuit implicitly
acknowledged that the military system is adequate and trustworthy enough
to perform its assigned task.188 In this regard, the congressional judgment
must be respected.189 Although the D.C. Circuit has adopted this principle,
prior decisions of the Supreme Court refused to do so.190
b. Factor two: the important countervailing interest
The second factor that directs a federal court to abstain from interfering
in a military commission proceedings is the “important countervailing
interest.”191 The Supreme Court should adopt an approach that allows the
military system established by the Congress and the President to be
completed before any Article III courts can interfere in either status
determinations or trials for war crimes.192 The framers of the MCA
implicitly intended that there should be no interference from the federal
courts until military commissions complete their work.193 Key to a better
detainment strategy is the principle that courts must give due deference to
the other branches on matters of national security. As in Al-Nashiri, the
court recognized that judgments from military commission arose “out of
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concern for national security needs,” which deserve “wide deference.”194
Thus, the Al-Nashiri court concluded that the important countervailing
interest was “the need for federal courts to avoid exercising their equitable
powers in a manner that would unduly impinge on the prerogatives of the
political branches in the sensitive realm of national security.”195 Comity
guides this decision, resulting in restraint of the courts from interfering
with such a “sensitive realm.”196
The key provision of the MCA is that it provides for Article III review,
but only at a specific point, and no sooner.197 First, there must be a status
determination initially made by a CSRT, then approved by a Department of
Defense official.198 Furthermore, there is a trial and a conviction in the
military system, approved by the convening authority, and then an appeal
to the CMCR.199 After this layer of review, there should be an additional
layer of review by a military review commission consisting of a civilian
judge and military judge before a challenge to detainment based on status
can be heard by an Article III court. Such a scheme not only provides the
military more control over matters of national security, but also allows the
end result to be reviewed in Article III courts only after passing through the
layers of the military system.200 By giving deference to the words of the
legislature, it is obvious that “[l]itigants may not . . . prevent the proper
operation of the congressional scheme by pursuing equitable relief in
district court.”201 Instruction by the “political branches” on the structure of
the military review system is enough to “qualif[y] as an ‘important
countervailing interest’ warranting abstention . . . where that instruction is
based on those branches’ assessment of national security needs.”202 As the
D.C. Circuit states in Al-Nashiri, the expertise of the political branches in
the realm of national security is at its “apogee.”203
Alleviating the Need for Judicial Intervention

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 124.
198. Id. at 122.
199. Id. at 124-25.
200. Id. at 125-26.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 125-26. Apogee has been defined as, “the farthest or highest
point” or culmination. Meriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Apogee, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/apogee (last visited June 14, 2017).
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The Al-Nahsiri court recognized key advantages to maintaining the
system established by the political branches.204 First, the need for immediate
intervention significantly decreases because an Article III court has the
opportunity to eventually remedy any errors on appeal after review by a
military review commission consisting of a civilian judge and military
judge.205 Also, following the guidance in Schlesinger, abstention in such
matters emphasizes and respects military expertise.206 Additionally, the
advantage of abstaining in pretrial intervention is that it “eliminates
‘duplicative proceedings,’ potentially ‘obviat[ing] the need for judicial
intervention,’ [while] ‘inform[ing] and narrow[ing]’ eventual Article III
review.”207
V. DETERMINING DURATION OF DETENTION
After a detainee’s status is determined and the procedural process
attaches, the next step is to determine how long detention is warranted.
This part of the detainment strategy also warrants less judicial interference
and more deference to the military. The Hamdi Court noted that indefinite
imprisonment, even on reasonable suspicion, was simply not an available
option of treatment for those accused of aiding the enemy.208 However,
defining what parameters constitute “definite” detention has proven
problematic. Unlike past wars, the War on Terrorism has not provided the
luxury of a defined limit in duration.209 This phenomenon poses a problem
to the detention of combatants involved in the War on Terror.
A. Two Schools of Thought
The majority holds to the principle that detention may last no longer
than active hostilities.210 The main question then becomes whether the
existence of hostilities is determined by a totality of the circumstances
analysis or by some declaration by one of the political branches. The
plurality view expressed in Hamdan states that a political, public act is

204. See, e.g., In re Al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
205. Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 127.
206. Id. at 125.
207. Id. at 127.
208. Benjamin S. White, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama: Must Eliminating Dangerous Terrorists
Entail Accepting Dangerous Political Doctrines?, 8 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 411, 433 (2014).
209. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797-98.
210. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
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needed to establish hostilities.211 The dissent’s view in Hamdan was that a
contemporaneous public act is not required, but that the determination
depends on a retrospective analysis.212
The U.S. government argues that the correct standard should be that
hostilities are determined by a retrospective and prospective analysis of the
factual situation on the ground.213 If it is determined that active hostilities
exist, or remain, then detainment is justified so long as it is necessary to
prevent enemy combatants from returning to the battlefield.214 Even a
complete withdrawal of all combat troops from a country does not end
hostilities, because there are other factual scenarios to be considered. The
first is whether Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or other hostile enemy forces have
the capacity to engage in hostilities based on their “embedment in local or
regional insurgencies.”215 Another factor to be considered is the hostile
group’s aggregate of affiliated groups who help plan and conduct attacks.216
This includes the recognition of a transnational conflict, not bound to any
geographic territory.217 The nature of the transnational conflict makes it
difficult for some to accept that the mere capability of a wide-reaching
network to engage in hostilities can justify detainment.218
Some argue, instead, that the standard is not based on whether hostilities
cease to exist with terrorist organizations, but whether they have ceased
with the detained individual “because he no longer poses a substantial
danger of rejoining hostilities.”219 However, determining whether an enemy
combatant poses a threat to rejoining can be precarious. A Summary
Report of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay confirmed that, as
of January 15, 2016, 30.2% of 676 detainees released from Guantanamo Bay
have rejoined militant activity or are suspected of rejoining militant
activity.220
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Justice Holmes once said, “Public danger warrants the substitution of
executive process for judicial process.”221 Because the executive branch
possesses the power of Commander in Chief, decisions pertaining to
matters of national security should fall squarely on his shoulders and not on
those of the Judiciary. The standard should be that detainment is necessary
so long as the detainee poses a threat of re-engaging in militant activity
against the United States. In Hamdi, Justice Thomas put greater weight in
the security interest than the liberty interest by recognizing that “the
Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate
circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest. For example, in
times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the
Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be
dangerous.”222
B. Deference to the Executive
Whether or not the “end of hostilities” has arrived in the fight against the
Taliban, there is still the potential that these detainees will return to the
battlefield and the service of another emerging terrorist group. While the
modern expansion of the theatre of war raises the stakes primarily in
protecting America’s security interests, it also affects liberty interests.
However,
[T]he Executive’s decision that a detention is necessary to protect
the public need not and should not be subjected to judicial
second-guessing. Indeed, at least in the context of enemycombatant determinations, this would defeat the unity, secrecy,
and dispatch that the Founders believed to be so important to the
war-making function.223
Detaining enemy combatants and preventing them from returning to the
theatre of war heightens the need to ensure that the basis of their detention
is justified, and that their detention is not constantly subject to judicial
second-guessing. With the processes outlined above, the adequate
protections afforded to detainees’ liberty interests during the detainee’s
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classification stage allow for a stronger argument to be made for indefinite
detention based on the continued dangerousness of the detainee or his
likelihood of re-engaging in hostilities against the United States. Thus, the
court should leave the determination of whether a detainee will return to
the battlefield to the political branches because the political braches have far
more experience and better authority to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
Balancing security and liberty is difficult, but it is essential to a
sustainable detainment strategy. The Court, in Hamdan, Boumediene, and
Hamdi failed to provide any guidance on the specific rights that detainees
enjoy, and made no determination on what the political branches could do
to avoid judicial interference. As recognized in Al-Nashiri, judicial review
must be used as a last resort in military detainment systems. More deference
must be given to the political branches to craft a system that highlights our
military expertise on the ground and does not detract from the maintenance
of national security.
This requires redefining our traditional definitions to better assess our
modern enemies’ methods of combat. Clearly defining the standards in
conjunction with a detainment strategy, both in classifying and trying
detainees, will prevent undue interference from federal courts and allow the
political branches and the military to operate in a manner that will best
protect the nation’s security.
The very nature of war grants the Executive a measure of deference, but a
common concern is that this deference lays the foundation for political
abuse of our liberty.224 However, national security and liberty can both be
maintained, without sacrificing either, by maintaining a detainment
strategy at the lowest level possible, away from judicial second-guessing and
within routine military operations in the theatre of war. Those on the
ground, not in chambers, are in the best possible position to determine a
detainee’s status and the likelihood that he will reengage in militant activity.
Therefore, it is within the Commander in Chief’s, and the military’s power
to make these decisions, not the Judiciary’s.
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